Seeing like a Starving State: The Soviet Political Economy of Death in the Blockade of Leningrad by Hass, J. K. & Lomagin, N. A.
© J. K. Hass, N. A. Lomagin, 2021
РОССИя в вОйНАх И РЕвОлюцИях хх вЕкА
 https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.202
J. K. Hass, N. A. Lomagin
Seeing like a Starving State:  
The Soviet Political Economy of  
Death in the Blockade of Leningrad
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How state elites and officials classify, measure, and analyze 
“death” is part of the practices of modern governance. Causes 
and rates of death shape how states plan for economic 
performance and war: more healthy citizens means better 
economies and armies, while higher death rates speak to 
problematic governance and can hinder state authority and 
capacity (e. g. for fighting wars). How elites and officials 
inside the state, then, “see” death — analytic visions for 
seeking and discursive frames for presenting those pictures 
— are part of overall practices of governing and of legitimating 
governance and governmentality. The Bolshevik regime and 
Soviet state were little different: control requiring counting, 
whether tons of steal of number of available workers and 
soldiers (and “counter-revolutionary” degenerates roaming 
around the country). Stalin’s politics of intrigue arguably made 
real counting difficult and even created contradictions, as 
managers and lower-level cadres reported what they thought 
higher-ups wanted to see; but the data they passed on were 
not entirely fictitious. Seeing like a Soviet state in the 1930s 
was a balancing act of playing on the margins of measurable 
“reality” while representing some facts of that socioeconomic 
“reality” — including life and death of Soviet citizens. 
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The Blockade of Leningrad challenged how the local Soviet state apparatus 
saw death (and by extension, life): What various officials within the state saw, how 
they saw it, what they expected or wanted to see, and how they articulated percep-
tions and responses. Unusually high death counts were not unusual to a regime that 
had caused and weathered other incidents of above-average death tolls: the Civil 
War, collectivization, and the Great Terror showed that concern for the sanctity of 
human life was not a core Bolshevik norm. Concerns about abortions and family sta-
bility — in particular, placing heavy restrictions on divorces and abortions — showed 
that the Stalinist regime was concerned for death and demographic trends as they 
affected the capacity of the state to govern, carry out important policies (e. g. rapid 
and sustained present and future industrialization), and fight wars. The death toll in 
the Blockade was concerning to the Bolshevik elite in Smolny, for reasons of govern-
ance and producing for the war effort, as well as for optics of appearing competent 
during the life-and-death struggle with Germany.
The Soviet state, like many states embedded in frames and ideologies of “high 
modernism”, attempted to code and organize society to make it more comprehen-
sible and manageable1. Soviet socialism was not only an ideology that aspired to ra-
tionalize society for progressive goals; it was also an ideology of a particular form of 
class struggle and control. Socialism in power embraced and imposed a “scientific” 
logic of relations and practices (e. g. the Five-Year Plan, centralized political economy 
without the uncertainty of the market) and a logic of a new status of order (e. g. the 
Communist Party as the font of legitimate knowledge for the benefit of a new he-
gemonic class). Such high modernism was grounded in a political and technocratic 
elitism: the Party knew best, and its ideology and frames of vision, and corresponding 
strategies for organizing Soviet economy and society, were supreme. 
This said, Stalin’s own politics of intrigue and control via terror worked at cross 
purposes with this high modernist approach to governance and governmentality. In 
contrast to a Party and state in theory oriented to reshaping economy and society 
in socialism’s image, Stalin’s politics resulted in, and almost required, uncertainty 
and some instability. To maintain his legitimacy as the oracle of Leninist wisdom, 
Stalin himself could not be pinned down to any concrete policy position: he had to 
be ready to alter policies, positions, and people so that no opposition could emerge 
and so that there would be mistakes that he and those who wanted his favor could 
then criticize for political gain (i. e. via repression). Part of this practice of power 
involved the NKVD consistently on the lookout for “counter-revolutionary” politics 
and behavior — but this remained a slippery concept so that it could be employed 
at will. If some bodies of the state and Party bureaucracy (e. g. Vesenkha, Gosplan, 
etc.) were looking on the economy and society as a mass to be shaped into specific 
operative form, others (NKVD) were looking for anything that Stalin, Yezhov, Beria, 
and others driven by arrests and repression could possibly interpret as a threat. 
The Stalinist state, then, suffered from (at least) double vision vis-à-vis society: 
potential for progressive (if costly) construction; and ubiquitous and always shape-
shifting threat2. The appearance of real threats could evoke different responses 
corresponding to these visions, with risks attached. The first vision was more uto-
pian, focused, and grounded in clearer categories (worker, kolkhoznik, and so on). It 
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involved a focus on preconceived, assumed causation and use of preconceived, pre-
pared responses. In the context of extreme threats, this vision could be effective if its 
categories and logics helped to accurately ascertain the nature of threat; if it did not, 
however, time and effort would be required to “recalibrate” this vision—which could 
result in a lag addressing that threat. And this points to one problem of this vision 
under duress: it is difficult to “see” a society in a forward-looking, utopian manner 
when the defining characteristic of duress is uncertainty and even the possibility of 
extermination — there might be no tomorrow to plan for, making the utopian lens 
problematic. The second (Stalinist) vision was more dystopian and grounded in a fix-
ation on and search for vague “saboteurs” and other malevolent actors (with traits of 
such threatening actors more amorphous than defined), justifying quick application 
of repression (exile, prison, firing squad). This vision was broad enough that it might 
locate sources of threat, but this then would require focus instead of a general vision 
of general “threat”. However, this dystopian vision also had its downside for wartime. 
While seeing a society as perpetually containing ever-present enemies might make 
the authorities more attuned to real saboteurs and similar malevolent actors, it also 
might lead authorities to see threats where they did not exist — in the process, 
drawing attention away from possible opportunities and necessities for adaptation 
and survival. Someone with a German surname might be viewed as an automatic 
threat, rather than as a potentially loyal (or at least ambivalent) citizens with abilities 
that could be harnessed for the war effort. 
In sum, this double vision did not leave the USSR ready to face threats — it put 
the country at even greater risk of errors in understanding and addressing causes 
of threat, and possibly of contradictions between the two visions in doing so. Our 
story here, and in the broader project from which this is drawn, is that the experience 
of extreme duress compelled a new logic of seeing society, with relevant practices 
of governance, to emerge and to start to take root in institutional configurations 
and procedures: a more pragmatic logic of governance and authority that we call 
“Blockade Bolshevism”3. In this essay we explore how that pragmatic vision and logic 
of governance emerged in the context of confronting mass death in the Blockade (as 
one of several such cases of duress and adaptation). We argue that in confronting 
Blockade death — and by extension, confronting Blockade life — both pre-war polit-
ical ways of seeing did not suffice. Ultimately, Smolny (what we dub the local regime) 
was compelled to become more pragmatic in how it “saw” Leningrad and what it was 
trying to see. This new pragmatic vision did not emerge de novo but instead did have 
pre-war roots; and it did emerging immediately or full-blown. But the experience of 
war did have the potential to remake Soviet political culture, and we suggest this 
brief narrative of “seeing like a starving state” reveals some facets of this process4.
Death in the Blockade: Seeing and Responding Like a Starving State
The Blockade was about to become such a threat and a test of this double 
Soviet vision. Subjected to extreme deficits in food, Leningrad was a starving state. 
In one attempt to figure out a range of figures about Blockade death, Nadezhda 
Cherepenina showed how different sources revealed different numbers: police and 
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ZAGs reports suggested a number closer to one million, whereas a count comparing 
the number of ration cards in circulation produced a different account. Counts based 
on hospital and morgue records could provide a third5. The amount of death one saw 
depended on where and how one looked. This is our launching point. For Cherep-
enina, the story is one of problematic data sources and a need to use them logically 
to produce as precise a number as possible. For us, it points to the question of how 
the state “sees” — no small issue for a state trying to defend a city from enemy attack 
(a threat without) and from starvation and resulting innovative acts of desperation 
by suffering victims (a threat within). For James C. Scott, how a state sees can have 
dire consequences. For his study, states that look upon society through the lenses 
of “high modernism” are likely to trample on important local knowledge and impose 
abstractions that do more harm than good — and that in the Soviet case, certainly 
provided the tools and flexibility to apply coercion to make sure society understood 
what was good for it. But states see in many ways — closer to a bee than to a human. 
When the war broke out, the Soviet state in Leningrad was looking at different 
facets of its civilian population. The fully effective accounting and control of all avail-
able human resources was one of the key pillars of the Soviet economy. As such, 
procedures for planning, control, and provision “saw” Leningrad society in different 
ways, from different institutional vantage points. We focus on three that were inter-
connected: labor, the dead, and living civilians. Our argument is that the double vi-
sion crystalized around a more pragmatic approach to seeing Leningrad, compelled 
by the need to survive. Ideological purity was not a mile wide and an inch deep, and 
those roots were deep enough that they could emerge after the war ended. How-
ever, they did not run that deep, and cadres and officials of the Soviet state, from 
Smolny on down, were capable to clearing away the ideological blinders — poten-
tially clearing the path for evolution in the direction of ore pragmatic authoritarianism. 
Seeing the Dead. We begin with a brief discussion of how state elites and 
officials “saw” rising mass death and the dead, especially in the first Blockade winter. 
The early Bolshevik Party and state had looked out at death through lenses of a new 
socialist rationality, trying to impose new Soviet rituals of disposal and commemora-
tion upon a mostly Orthodox population; some newer traditions stuck, while others 
(e. g. cremation) took less hold6. In good bureaucratic fashion of the new Soviet ra-
tionalism, the Soviet state looked upon death as a statistic important for reckoning 
with the state of Soviet society. From the outset of war on June 22, 1941, up to De-
cember 1941, the city administration7 was able to keep fairly accurate records of the 
mortality rate. For instance, reports by Burial Trust (Pokhoronnoe Delo) show that 
just before the war, the average daily death toll in Leningrad was about 105 people; 
in the first half of 1941 Burial Trust buried 18,909 people8. (During the war, special 
attention was paid to mortality amongst the group of those 15 years old and older; 
growth of mortality by 8.9 percent was alarming)9. As Cherepenina noted, what the 
state counted (the number of dead) depended on how the state looked for the dead. 
However, the system for registering deaths itself was fragmented — which presumes 
the dead were found in the first place. The most accurate information was collected 
by the regional NKVD, which coordinated surveillance and security in the city. Re-
gional NKVD reported on mortality both to Moscow and Smolny. However, the NKVD 
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had many tasks but limited labor. Burial Trust and cemeteries were not interested 
in an undercount of the dead, because they were remunerated based on services 
provided  — more dead meant more money, although this created an incentive for 
occasionally cooking the books to register truly “dead souls”10. ZAGS (Otdel zapisei 
aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia), the state body responsible registering births, 
marriages, and deaths, also faced challenges in registering and thus determining 
the number of deaths. 
Formal procedures were supposed to provide accurate counts of the number 
of dead, who exactly had died, and what they died from. One mobile group of Burial 
Trust, with health-care services of local department of the MPVO, collected corpses 
in places of bombardments and artillery fire. All corpses were subject to identifi-
cation within 48 hours. Those not identified by relatives were to be photographed. 
The dead were buried in tranches, while all related documents (photos and death 
certificates) were kept in order. Victims’ valuables were passed directly to the finan-
cial office of the appropriate city district. Regarding the number of burials, the Trust 
provided the same number about deaths as other official documents: 3688 people in 
July, 5090 in August, 7820 in September, 9355 in October, and 11401 in November. 
According to Burial Trust, the mortality rate grew 2.5  times in December, reaching 
about 1400 people per day (42,000 per month). Yet accuracy of such data could be 
questioned, for several reasons. One is that starvation as the increasingly important 
cause of civilian deaths required devising new categories for coding mass death11. As 
odd as this might seem, medical authorities did not code such death as “starvation”, 
but instead used categories for causes that might stem from starvation12. What was 
the authority able to “see” in these new circumstances? Also, the increasing amount 
of death began to overwhelm the state, clouding its vision. By the end of November 
1941, ZAGS failed to issue death certificates in hospitals on the day that a person 
died, and relatives had to wait several days for the certificate. On December 10, 1941, 
city authorities allocated extra labor to ZAGS branches across Leningrad (two addi-
tional people per branch); the ten largest hospitals received the right to issue death 
certificates themselves. Civilian deaths at home were registered by the local militia 
and housing management bureau (zhilkontora). On December 25, 1941, Lengoris-
polkom allowed as a “temporary measure” the burial of the dead on lists provided by 
appropriate hospitals and other medical institutions following registrations of those 
deaths at ZAGS. To collect those who died at home or on the streets, morgues were 
created in each district of the city. On request of relatives, morgues had to issue 
special papers for receiving corpses13.
Challenges to seeing death went beyond making sense of exactly what they 
were seeing. Another challenge to pre-war sight was that there were some Soviet 
citizens the state simply did not see, because it did not know where or how to look. 
The police might find corpses, but the most important record-keeper was families 
and friends of the dead, who might alert the police to those deaths. In particular, this 
was the case with refugees. Dozens of thousands of civilians who were unregistered 
with the city authorities and lived in the city before the war, or had become refugees 
there, perished during the Blockade with no record at all. About a hundred thousand 
civilian refugees from the Baltics, Pskov, and Novgorod had fled from the Nazis to 
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Leningrad and were caught in the siege. Some were evacuated in September and 
October 1941 across Lake Ladoga, and those who remained were left to their own 
desperate devices. Together with city residents living alone after their families were 
evacuated or who had no families at all in Leningrad, this group was almost missed 
from bureaucratic records, especially when most factories were closed temporarily 
for lack of electricity. In fact, there was often nobody to report the death of these 
people, whether they died at home or on the streets. The police were busy with other 
business and not always interested in discovering the names of those who died on 
the street. Hence, the registration of such cases was very complicated.
Another significant factor hindering an accurate count of the dead was that 
many practices regarding the dead were in institutional shadows and thus not di-
rectly in the state’s line of vision: seeing the dead, in other words, was complicated 
by the fact that the state had to investigate the murkiness of institutional shadows. 
One shadow strategy was civilians hiding their dead for purposes of survival. By not 
alerting the authorities to a death, the survivors retained the dead person’s ration 
cards and could augment their own food supply. Hiding corpses was also beneficial 
for opportunistic cadres in housing management (the infamous upravdom) and in 
the city’s bureau on accounting for ration cards. These cadres could enrich them-
selves in the first Blockade winter in a similar way, by not reporting the dead but 
retaining their ration cards and obtaining extra food (which they could consume or 
sell in shadow markets). In a way, for a short period of time, the interests of poor 
people whose rations were miserable coincided with those of opportunistic officials, 
and they both played this game of survival or profit against the state. On the other 
hand, Ivan Andreenko told Daniil Granin in the 1980s that in late autumn 1941, about 
90,000 rations cards were not exchanged by Leningraders at bread shops to get their 
bread rations — meaning that those people likely died or were close to death and had 
no one to take their ration cards to bakeries, so that nobody could use those cards14. 
Also, directors of factories and institutions reported inflated data on the number of 
workers at their organizations, thus playing yet another role in this game. A discus-
sion of assistance to heavily exhausted people at a Leningrad Party bureau meeting 
on January 9, 1942, shed light on this issue. Aleksei Kuznetsov noted that it was 
surprising that the number of ration cards issued in January 1942 was 15,000  less 
than the number issued in December 1941, while at a minimum 50,000 people had 
been evacuated and about the same number had died. Kuznetsov said, “We have a 
reduction at a minimum of 100,000, but according to the number of ration cards, the 
population declined just by 15,000. Is this abuse, or is it not? For sure, it is abuse. 
Who does this? It is directors of factories and institutions who submit inflated figures, 
and those figures are not checked properly. And the number of workers in January 
grew by 12,000. I am not sure that the working class grew in January… Why did all 
this happen? Because they began cheating Party and Soviet institutions…”15
When the Blockade was lifted and Extraordinary Commission on Investigation 
of Crimes committed by the Germans began to work, additional information became 
available. First, those who hid corpses of the dead in frozen apartments sand rooms 
during the first Blockade winter to collect their ration cards eventually had to report 
those deaths. Second, some Leningraders evacuated from the city made inquiries 
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about the fate of those who stayed in besieged Leningrad and with whom commu-
nication was lost. Appropriate checks by police and housing managers resulted in 
different findings: some people were reported as missing, some as evacuated, and 
others as dead. Third, the Blockade death toll increased substantially after inde-
pendent scholars began to count as victims of the siege those who have died either 
during evacuation or shortly after it from hunger or related deceases. 
In sum, a combination of fragmented bureaucratic structures and procedures, 
strategies for survival and opportunism, and the massive number of dead clouded 
the state’s vision of how many civilians perished at any given time. This would con-
tribute to later politics of the real number of the dead, and by extension the real 
quality and competence of the Soviet state under wartime duress16. The desperate 
need to figure out the number of the dead, and the next question of what to do with 
them and how to reduce the death toll, drove pragmatism in how the Soviet state in 
Leningrad looked out onto its society. But by not having an accurate figure of how 
many died, the state also did not have entirely accurate information on the number 
of the living, which could affect provision for the civilian population: more deaths 
meant fewer mouths to feed and thus higher rations, and vice versa. The practices 
and structures clouding the state’s vision of the dead also clouded its vision of 
the living. 
Seeing the Living I: Labor. Life and death are two sides to the same (human) 
coin, and so seeing and seeking death had repercussions on how the Soviet regime 
saw and sought life  — especially because mass death threatened the regime’s 
capacity to prosecute the war and defend the city and Motherland, and because 
mass death could threaten the regime’s very legitimacy (and this in the city where 
wartime deprivation sparked the February Revolution). We can also add that labor 
was clearly in the state’s field of vision, and so threats to the labor force would also 
be in its vision — as would the nature of labor that dealt with collecting and disposing 
of the dead. Even with 3.2 million people in 1941, Leningrad still needed hundreds of 
thousands of new hands for ambitious projects. In addition to further development 
of military factories, the city was going to begin labor-intensive construction of the 
city’s metro. More manpower was also required for social services, such as medical 
care, education, public catering, and utilities. In the late 1940, the Leningrad plan-
ning committee conducted a special study into labor resources in the city to seek 
reserves for growing industrial and construction needs. The findings came to a series 
of key conclusions: there were about 50,000 men aged 16–59 not employed in any 
sector of Leningrad’s economy, and about 340,000 women of the same age group 
could cover the labor demand of 175,000 people. The use of women was conditional 
on availability of day-care facilities and nursery schools. Significant “hidden” labor 
reserves were found in industry (30,000  people), transportation (10,000  people), 
construction (8,000 people), retail (4,000 people). There were about 10,000 office 
workers who could be transferred to other sectors of economy, including manufac-
turing17. Regarding general data on demography in pre-war Leningrad, the city ad-
ministration18 collected and analyzed detailed data on birth rates, mortality19, number 
of marriages and divorces, and leading causes of death. It is no exaggeration to say 
that Smolny kept a very close eye on all strata in Leningrad. 
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One area that would grow in significance in the grander scheme of Leningrad 
labor was that of disposal of the dead. The main agent for such labor and services 
was Burial Trust. On the day war broke out (June 22, 1941), Burial Trust received 
additional resources for transportation (twelve buses and 34 horses); workshops to 
produce coffins, monuments, fences, and the like for the dead; and 109 gravedig-
gers, 64 janitors, and 77 watchmen. Eleven cemeteries were at disposal of the Trust 
for burials. By August 1941, light morgues were built in six of the main cemeteries. 
All of this seemed to suffice at that moment. Tragically, this was an underestimation 
of the needs for disposal labor. The enormous mortality rate in Leningrad caused 
enormous problems with burial of corpses. The Trust failed to deliver due to the lack 
of all necessary resources to carry out their tasks. Of 109 gravediggers, 49 died from 
hunger; there were not enough trucks to handle the increasing number of the dead; 
and the cemeteries filled quickly. (In the first months of war, most burials were in indi-
vidual graves.) Civilians sought private services for coffins, transportation, and cem-
etery plots for their deceased kith and kin. On December 18, 1941, two employees 
of Burial Trust wrote a letter to the Leningrad City chairman Petr Popkov, arguing for 
burying civilian dead in mass graves (bratskie mogily) before mass burials “became 
a serious political problem”20. The “political problem” was twofold, which the state’s 
vision initially missed: the aesthetics of disposal, and growing markets for disposal. 
There already had been some inkling in Smolny that extraordinary measures would 
need to be taken: already in November, expecting a substantial rise in the wartime 
death toll, the Trust excavated 280  tranches (dimensions 20  × 2.5  × 1.7  m). This 
was far from enough. In December 1941 there were around 7,000 unburied corpses 
near hospitals, morgues, and evacuation stations. On December 25, 1941, the Chief 
Manager of Burial Trust was fired and put on trial for allowing this to happen. In 
response to the new and growing crises of disposing of the dead, the City Council 
authorized digging mass graves near existing cemeteries as well on Decembrists’ 
Island, Vesely Poselok, and Piskarevka21. Four excavators, 200  gravediggers, and 
extra rations (including vodka or wine) were supposed to improve productivity of 
cleaning the city of corpses. In January 1942, each city district assigned 400 workers 
to help with collecting and burring corpses. During winter up to 4000 people worked 
daily in cemeteries of Leningrad. Usually in the winter 1941–1942, truck drivers trans-
porting corpses to cemeteries had to produce papers from morgues that indicated 
the number of corpses in their trucks. According to one former official at Piskarëvka, 
there were cases when truck drivers did not bring any papers to the cemetery. As a 
result, many real corpses delivered were not registered and did not end up in data 
bases (such as they were at the time)22.
At the end of 1941 and into 1942, the state began looking more closely at labor, 
and not only at Burial Trust’s needs to get the job done. City Police Chief Grushko, 
NKVD officials, and various investigators  — whose jobs were to be on the lookout 
for disorder — turned to disposal work with a critical eye. They found three things to 
criticize: the pace of work, aesthetics of said work, and emerging shadow markets 
in disposing of civilian dead23. First, disposal work was going far too slowly, although 
this was in part to insufficient labor and supplies (from special clothing and soap for 
workers, to lime for mass graves, to gasoline for tractors)24. Second, disposal work 
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was not following norms of discipline and tidiness (to the extent this was possible); 
corpses were scattered around cemetery sites and stacked almost chaotically in 
sheds and other places. For Grushko in particular, this created an image of disre-
spect for civilian dead. Whether Grushko personally felt outrage at this disrespect, 
he certainly believed that this could spark some civilian backlash and discontent25. 
Third, some gravediggers were taking payment in rubles, vodka, and bread to dis-
pose of the civilian dead in some meaningful manner, from digging an individual 
grave to placing the dead in a particular part of a mass grave so that relatives would 
have some idea of where their late relative were resting eternally. Civilians wrote 
about such practices26, and soon the state found out. In part to reduce shadow trade 
in death services, gravediggers and cemetery officials were forbidden from taking 
the dead out of coffins, so that disposal personnel could not then resell these coffins 
on the side to grieving civilians27. A later investigation into Burial Trust work revealed 
some degree of the extent of such market practices, and how some officials and 
gravediggers demanded payment to do their jobs with respect formally demanded of 
them anyway28. For all Grushko’s demands for discipline and punishment, however, 
there was little the state could do except look  — seeing like a disempowered, not 
just starving, state.
Seeing the Living II: Mothers. In the living the Soviet state saw not only real 
(and threatened) labor; in the dead they see lost labor, soldiers, and loyalty. When 
states look for the dead, they leave open the possibility of figuring out why they died 
so that they can control death more readily — thus defending the living. Those living 
can contribute military labor (e. g. soldiers), or they can comprise a combination 
of material support (e. g. producing for the war effort and the general economy) 
and symbolic support (loyalty and morale to defend the regime’s back as it fights 
external enemies). Thus, Soviet state and Communist Party looked out not only for 
the working and the dead, but others who were living — not necessarily out of any 
liberal inclinations to care for the personal well-being of the civilian population, but 
certainly to defend the wellspring of legitimacy and material production. Yet seeing 
the living was then joined by deciding what to do about them, and for this issue 
during the war and Blockade, the state had to make difficult and sometimes harsh 
choices. In his (in)famous Leningrad v blokade, Dmitrii Pavlov, the representative of 
the State Defense Committee in Leningrad charged with food policy, cited Lenin’s 
claim in 1921 that food distribution cannot be viewed through the prism of fairness. 
Food distribution , instead, a tool for increasing production, and food distribution 
should privilege those needed for higher productivity29.
But the state’s vision was not uniform across the civilian field. Rather, that vi-
sion was shaped by different measures of utility. Living bodies that could contribute 
to the war effort received the relatively kindest gaze and best rations. (This did not 
always sit well with other civilians, who sometimes wrote scathing letters to Smolny 
protesting this injustice and claiming that they, too, made important contributions 
to the war effort)30. One way to “look” for and at the living was through occasional 
registration of ration cards. In this way, the regime could know who was alive and the 
worth of their labor, so that rations could be adjusted as per the regime’s judgment 
of worth. While abuses of ration cards could skew the perception of how many living 
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civilians were in the city — and there were various strategies for opportunistic, be-
yond those noted earlier — overall the regime kept a decent measure of the living, 
perhaps better than that of the dead. In some cases, looking for the living involved 
measures not only of current worth to the war effort, but also future worth (labor) 
as well as current worth (legitimacy). One such lens of vision was expecting and 
new mothers. Children were an important anchor of valence in the city31, such that 
the regime could not entirely ignore them or their mothers. On January 3, 1942, 
Smolny decided to increase food rations for those women who expected babies in 
four months or less32. By spring 1942, it evaluated the situation of maternity clinics 
and birth rates. This vision seemed pretty clear: data on rations, overall conditions 
in clinics, infant mortality was very detailed and complete33. The clear problem was 
that pregnant women needed extra nutrition, for obvious reasons, but they were not 
getting in clinics. Table 1 provides data on their rations.
In fact, pregnant women received only a half of rations that they were supposed 
to receive, according to usual clinical literature and norms. As a result, there were 
too many premature babies weighing under 2,000 grams — significant for newborn 
children. A sharp decline in the quality of work by staff in maternity clinics, bad health 
conditions for newborn babies, low temperatures in the clinics, and a lack of breast 
milk (due to mothers’ near-starvation diets) led not only to rising numbers of prema-
ture births, but also to “unacceptably high infant mortality” (table 2). 
The mortality rate among women giving birth sharply increased as well. In 
January 1941, only 0.15 percent of such women died. By January 1942, the rate was 
already 3.7  percent, rising to 9.1  percent in February. To reduce infant mortality, 
Smolny ordered to increase medical control over pregnant women, to raise their food 
and vitamins supplies, and to provide maternity clinics with electricity and firewood34.
Such vantage points came from the state’s own volition, its own attempt to 
look at various parts of Leningrad society from various angles. Sometimes civilians 
Table 1
Nutrition norms for pregnant women, 1942







Dry fruits 50 152
Total 2,780
Source: TsGAIPD SPb, f. 4000, op. 20, d. 23, l. 121.
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themselves could leap into the state’s line of vision. One important way was through 
letters to the regime. Almost every day Party and City Council officials received hun-
dreds of letters from starving Leningraders, whose voices were no less informative or 
convincing than dry statistical data. Many letters were addressed to Andrei Zhdanov 
and Ivan Andreenko (who made public announcements about food). After January 
1942, many of these letters were re-routed to the newly organized Food Commission, 
whose job was to pass judgment on contingent or extraordinary requests of situations 
concerning doling out extra food. While the majority of letters were pleas for mar-
ginal extra portions of food (which is about what they got), some letters suggested 
policy innovations for civilian well-being. Some suggestions recommended — in so 
many words  — seeing the civilian population less as a source of labor or soldiers, 
and more as junior partners in governance and defense of the city. For example, on 
January 11, 1942, one schoolteacher (surname Michurina) wrote a detailed letter to 
Zhdanov. She offered him a series of measures which aimed at better management 
in food distribution, including public control over heads of canteens, improvement 
of medical services, bringing to Leningrad vitamins, drugs and medical doctors, and 
arranging fast death registration and burial of corpses. She also made a strong point 
on the need to explain people through the radio how to consume daily rations, and 
how to behave in case sickness. Finally, she asked Zhdanov to make a speech on 
the radio to raise public morale35. This letter was forwarded to Popkov. Zhdanov also 
asked him to make a speech on the radio. 
From Theocratic to Pragmatic Sight?
Bolshevism was consistently afflicted with double vision before the war: the 
need for real data on the state of the economy, demographics, and political loyalty; 
but also a fixation on “counter-revolution” grounded (especially since the Civil War) 
in a mentality of constant class war and a routinized paranoia born of roots in its 
pre-Revolutionary underground existence. In a sense, this was s double theocratic 
vision born of ideological dreams of a new alternative modernity, and born of fear 
of competing visions and ideologies that could undercut the regime’s very raison 
d’etre. While we do not disagree with this appraisal of Bolshevik political culture, we 
also suggest it is limited and static. Much received scholarly wisdom of the ages is 
that Bolshevik political culture was grounded in Marxism-Leninism and in ideology 
Table 2
Mortality of newborn children in Leningrad, January-February 1942




# that died after birth
Total Normal Premature Total Normal Premature 
January 2202 2110 1304 906 86 539 143 396
February 1590 1594 636 958 136 473 80 397
Source: TsGAIPD SPb, f. 4000, op. 20, d. 23, l. 124.
335J. K. Hass, N. A. Lomagin. Seeing like a Starving State…
Новейшая история России. 2021. Т. 11, № 2
generally, and that Bolshevism was incapable of pragmatic adaptations and evo-
lution. By a “pragmatic” logic we do not mean pragmatic twists and turns in policy 
in the name of defending the purity of the ideology and its carrier, the Communist 
Party36. We mean that the core logic of Bolshevism could have evolved away from 
ideological purity and a theocratic core (e. g. of Marxism-Leninism), towards a more 
pragmatic form of rule in general, with the core norm the maintenance of the Com-
munity Party’s monopoly of power37. This is one core argument of the project from 
which this paper is drawn.
We suggest that a moral of this brief story is that the double vision we noted 
early could resolve around a more pragmatic, and even realistic, vision in which 
high modernism and institutionalized suspicion were downplayed, in favor of a more 
pragmatic vision and more pragmatic policies as a result. If this was the case, then 
this suggests that the Bolshevik logic of authority could also shift, from theocracy 
and its practices of ideological purity and double vision, to a more pragmatic author-
itarianism in which ideology and its symbolic trappings, while not unimportant, were 
not longer required touchstones for politics and political economy. We know that this 
did not happen: zhdanovshchina, the Leningrad Affair, the Doctor’s Plot, and high 
Stalinism generally were the history that unfolded. However, that history did unfold 
this way does not mean that it would inevitably unfold this way. Had Stalin died soon 
in 1945 or soon after (or had some magical change of heart), this pragmatism would 
not have led immediately to capitalism and parliamentary democracy: Soviet elites 
and officials were too invested in Bolshevik socialism, whether by habit or belief (or 
both). However, if Bolshevik logics of governance (not just outward appearances) 
could shift in a non-trivial fashion during the war, then those shifts would leave 
legacies and reveal that the Soviet political economy could have shifted, perhaps 
towards a “NEP reboot”. That it ultimately would not evolve towards pragmatic 
authoritarianism is the historical record; what happened to that pragmatism after 
the war, and in the 1960s, is a bigger thesis for a different time. Yet this possible 
alternative compels us to rethink the nature of Soviet institutions, authority, political 
economy — and even Stalinism. 
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